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SimulationsTypical wireless sensor networks (WSNs) applications are characterized by a certain num-
ber of different requirements such as: data accuracy, localization, reputation, security, and
conﬁdentiality. Moreover, being often battery powered, WSNs face the challenge of ensur-
ing privacy and security despite power consumption limitations. When the application sce-
nario allows their use, data aggregation techniques can signiﬁcantly reduce the amount of
data exchanged over the wireless link at the price of an increased computational complex-
ity and the potential exposition to data integrity risks in the presence of malicious nodes. In
this paper, we propose DARE, an hybrid architecture combining WSNs with the wireless
mesh networking paradigm in order to provide secure data aggregation and node reputa-
tion in WSNs. Finally, the use of a secure veriﬁable multilateration technique allows the
network to retain the trustworthiness of aggregated data even in the presence of malicious
node. Extensive performance evaluations carried out using simulations as well as a real-
world prototype implementation, show that DARE can effectively reduce the amount of
data exchanged over the wireless medium delivering up to 50% battery lifetime improve-
ment to the wireless sensors.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the recent years the number of applications using
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) has dramatically in-
creased and therefore requirements such as data accuracy,
localization, reputation, security, and conﬁdentiality are
becoming more and more important in many application
scenarios. Moreover, since WSNs are very often battery
powered, optimizing the power consumption of wireless
sensors nodes is considered of vital importance by both
researchers and practitioners.
Thus, it is necessary to design WSNs meeting the above
requirements while satisfying the power constraints im-
posed by the technology. Notice that such requirements
are very often related one another. For instance, in aWSN monitoring physical quantities (e.g., temperature),
data accuracy depends on nodes position since it is neces-
sary to know where sensors are located in order to have an
accurate picture of the status of the monitored environ-
ment. Since the position of sensor nodes is often computed
by means of nodes cooperation, attacks such as node dis-
placement; wormholes fabricated communication links;
distance enlargement by introducing fake nodes; dissemi-
nation of false position and distance information by com-
promising nodes, may lead to an incorrect information
about nodes position, threatening in this way the security
of the whole WSN.
Typical security and privacy techniques used in wireless
networks are not directly applicable to WSNs due to their
needs in terms of power consumption. A possible solution
is represented by a technique known as Veriﬁable Multila-
teration (VM) [1] that allows one to determine the level of
trustworthiness associated with the position reported by a
sensor node based on the previous behavior of the node it-
self. In other words nodes are associated with a level of
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coming from nodes having a good reputation, are consid-
ered trustworthy, while data coming from nodes having a
bad reputation are not.
Another way to reduce the overall power consumption
of a WSN is based on minimizing the number of data trans-
missions, since this operation is the most energy demand-
ing one. This can be done by using data aggregation
techniques [2,3], which can signiﬁcantly reduce the
amount of data exchanged over the wireless link, while
increasing the amount of computation performed by sensor
nodes. However, data aggregation raises several privacy
and security issues since it is potentially vulnerable to
attackers who, for instance, may inject bogus information
without being detected. Secure aggregation techniques,
such as the one deﬁned by Castelluccia et al. [4], which
guarantees end-to-end conﬁdentiality and integrity to the
aggregated data, can be used to overcome such issues.
However, data aggregation, veriﬁable multilateration
along with other known techniques may not be enough
to ensure the level of security required within the power
constraints imposed by the WSN technology. In fact, the
limited WSN resources in term of power on one hand
and the application requirements on the other hand, call
for new solutions. Thus, we decided to move from the tra-
ditional architecture comprising only wireless sensor
nodes and use a hybrid architecture, that is the combina-
tion of two or more network architectures, in order to ex-
ploit the capabilities offered by the integration of different
technologies.
In this paper, we introduce DARE (evaluating Data
Accuracy using node REputation), an hybrid architecture
combining WSNs and wireless mesh networks (WMNs)
exploiting the gateway/bridge functionalities of mesh rou-
ters that allows the integration of WMNs with other net-
works [5]. Sensor nodes provide only sensing
functionalities and they forward sensed data to the closest
mesh router. Mesh routers, in turn, provide secure data
aggregation and node localization capabilities and are in
charge of relaying the aggregated data to the Sink. Such
an architecture reduces the amount of data exchanged
over the network, by splitting the required functionalities
between sensor nodes and mesh routers leaving the latter
in charge of the more computationally intensive tasks.
We already investigated secure and energy efﬁcient
WSNs in some of our previous works [6–11]. More specif-
ically, in [11] we deﬁned a hybrid solution between wire-
less sensors and mesh networks to perform secure data
aggregation without taking into account node localization
nor node reputation. DyDAP [6] presented an approach
coupling a privacy management policy with an original
aggregation algorithm able to deal with end-to-end en-
crypted data, without taking into account node localization
nor node reputation. In [10] an analysis of malicious node
behavior during localization is investigated in depth
exploiting game of theory concepts, but power consump-
tion and data integrity are not addressed. Thus, DARE ex-
tends the results obtained in our previous works deﬁning
a hybrid architecture that, in addition to implement secure
data aggregation, allows nodes to be localized by using
their reputation.Moreover, an evaluation of the power consumption of
DARE architecture and the related battery lifetime is con-
ducted using the energy consumption models presented
in [12]. Finally, DARE performances are investigated by
means of simulations whose results show that our ap-
proach outperforms other solutions. In addition, we devel-
oped a prototype to test the practical viability of our
approach in realistic settings.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follow: Sec-
tion 2 summarizes the security model used in this work,
while Section 3 describes the DARE network architecture.
Section 4 presents the results of the simulation tests, while
the results obtained by exploiting a real-world prototype
are reported in Section 5. Finally, a brief overview of the
state of the art is presented in Section 6; while Section 7
draws some conclusions and provides hints for future
works.2. Security model
The application domains of WSN are really wide spread-
ing from telemedicine to military applications, from ambi-
ent monitoring to smart city applications and so on. A lot of
such applications provide services that use average data,
for example the average temperature, the average pres-
sure. For such a kind of applications it is possible to reduce
the amount of data transmitted over the wireless medium
using in-network aggregation techniques. Notice that in
this case the power consumption of sensor nodes is re-
duced because sensor nodes use more power during the
transmission and reception communication phases than
when performing computation [13]. Thus, aggregation pro-
tocols may help in reducing the overall trafﬁc among
nodes. At the same time, since nodes are the attack goals
of malicious users who try to violate the conﬁdentiality
and the integrity of data, proper countermeasures are
needed to perform a secure data aggregation. Encryption
can be used to secure node communication, both hop-by-
hop and end-to-end secure data aggregation are supported.
In the former case, the data are encrypted by sensing nodes
and decrypted by aggregators. The aggregator nodes, then,
decrypt the data coming from the sensing nodes, aggregate
them, and encrypt them again, until eventually the Sink
node gets the ﬁnal encrypted aggregation result (and de-
crypts it). In the end-to-end approach the intermediate
aggregators manipulate only encrypted data and they have
no keys to decrypt them. In our work we consider applica-
tions that use the aggregated data based on an operation of
sum of sensing data. For this kind of data it is possible to
use, for example, the additively homomorphic aggregation
model deﬁne by Castelluccia et al. [4], which allows en-
crypted data to be aggregated without decrypting the data
hop-by-hop. We chose this end-to-end secure aggregation
solution in which an attack to any aggregator node is not
able to compromise the whole system.
Beside reducing trafﬁc amount in secure manner there
is another requirement related to the node position, which
requires to be computed by node cooperation (i.e., nodes
exchange information in order to allow an estimation).
The node positions can be evaluated by using a multilater-
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by exploiting a set of landmark nodes, called the anchor
nodes, whose positions are known. However, the node po-
sition estimation should be object of different kind of secu-
rity attacks. In order to address such security problems in
literature many solutions are available. In DARE we adopt
the Veriﬁable Multilateration (VM) [1] for its capability
in classifying malicious node behavior. Notice that the
robustness of VM is investigated in depth in our previous
work [10].
Summarizing, our security model is composed of two
main blocks: the end-to-end secure data aggregation
scheme exploiting additively homorphic encryption [4]
and the veriﬁable multilateration [1] technique. The for-
mer guarantees the conﬁdentiality and integrity of the
aggregated data, while the latter allows us to identify mali-
cious nodes. In this section we brieﬂy describe the end-to-
end secure data aggregation algorithm and the VM
algorithm.
2.1. Secure aggregation
The algorithm of Castelluccia et al. [4] is based on a sim-
ple and secure additively homomorphic stream cipher that
allows efﬁcient aggregation of encrypted data. Homomor-
phic encryption schemes are especially useful in scenarios
where someone, having no decryption keys, needs to per-
form arithmetic operations on a set of ciphertexts.
The cipher uses modular additions and is therefore very
well suited for CPU-constrained devices like sensors. More-
over, aggregation based on this cipher can be used to efﬁ-
ciently compute statistical values such as mean, variance,
and standard deviation of sensed data, enabling signiﬁcant
bandwidth gain.
The main idea of [4] is to replace the XOR (Exclusive-
OR) operation, typically found in stream ciphers, with
modular addition. For reader convenience, we will brieﬂy
sketch the additively homomorphic encryption scheme
proposed in [4] by applying it in the context of WSN.
Let us consider a network comprising N nodes, each of
which is uniquely identiﬁed by a label ni, 1 6 i 6 N. More-
over let Xi denote an integer number representing the data
measured/sensed by node ni, where Xi 2 [0;M  1] and M
is a large enough integer, whose value is discussed later on.
Thus, the encrypted ciphertext ci of datum Xi measured
by node ni is given by
ci ¼ EncðXi; kiÞ ¼ Xi þ ki ðmodðMÞÞ: ð1Þ
where Enc, mod and ki respectively represent the encryp-
tion operation, the modulus operation and the node key
used for encryption/ decryption operation.
The aggregation of J different ciphertexts c1, . . . , cJ re-
ceived from other nodes is carried out in the following
way:
caggr ¼
XJ
i¼1
ci ðmodðMÞÞ ð2Þ
Since the above encryption scheme is additively homomor-
phic, we have that if c1 = Enc(X1,k1) and c2 = Enc(X2, k2) then
c1 + c2 = Enc(X1 + X2, k1 + k2).As a consequence, the cleartext of the aggregated data X
can then be obtained by:
X ¼ Decðcaggr; kÞ ¼ caggr  kðmodðMÞÞ; k ¼
XJ
i¼1
ki: ð3Þ
where Dec represents the decryption operation, while K is
equal to the sum of the keys of the nodes whose sensed en-
crypted data are aggregated.
In order to prove its viability in a realistic scenario, we
implemented a speciﬁc use case on top of our hybrid archi-
tecture. The ensuing application computes the average and
the variance of the physical phenomena monitored by the
WSN (e.g., the temperature).
In the application scenario envisioned in this work, each
sensor node periodically samples the environmental tem-
perature. The collected data is then forwarded to the
aggregator node through the sensors, where the secure
aggregation scheme is implemented. In order to obtain
average and variance, sensor nodes are required to
compute:
S ¼
Xn
i¼1
Xi V ¼
Xn
i¼1
X2i ð4Þ
where Xi is the individual value measured by a sensor
node and n is the total number of answering sensors. The
Sink will then receive two distinct values, which can be
used to compute both the average E(x) and the variance
Var(x):
EðxÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
Xi
n
Eðx2Þ ¼
Xn
i¼1
X2i
n
ð5Þ
VarðXÞ ¼ Eðx2Þ  EðxÞ2 ð6Þ
It is worth noting that, in computing the average, the mod-
ulus M must be large enough to prevent any overﬂow. The
modulus is thus chosen as follows: M = n⁄p, where
p =max(mi) is the maximum value that can be assumed
by the message, and n is the total number of sensor nodes
in the network. Therefore each ciphertexts will be
log(M) = log(p) + log(n) bits long. Moreover, if also the vari-
ance of the measured data has to be derived an additional
modulus M0 is necessary for the sum of the squares. As for
the average, also M0 must be large enough to prevent over-
ﬂow and it is then chosen as follows: M0 = n⁄p2. The size of
the ciphertext is therefore log(M0) = 2⁄log(p) + log(n) bits.
Two strings, each of them 32 bits long, have been used
to encode, respectively, the sum of the values reported by
each sensor node ðPni¼1XiÞ and sum of their squares
ðPni¼1X2i Þ. Setting the maximum number of sensor nodes
allowed in the WSNs to n = 28 = 256, leaves us with 24 bits
to represent p2. As a result, we have the following con-
straint on the range temperatures that can be represented:
mi 2 [0,212]. In fact, in order to represent the square of the
maximum value that can be assumed by mi (212 = 4096)
without incurring in any overﬂow, 24 bits are necessary.
Hence, notice that in order to correctly decrypt it is impor-
tant to provide the identiﬁcations id of the node involved
in the aggregation process. In fact, such an information is
Fig. 1. Reference network model for the hybrid mesh/sensor secure
aggregation scheme.
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used in equation (3), more details are discussed in next
section.
The keystream k can be generated using a streamcipher,
such as RC4, keyed with a node secret key and a unique
message. Finally, each sensor node shares a unique secret
key with the Sink of the WSN. Such keys are derived from
a master secret (known only to the Sink) and distributed
to the sensor nodes. However, the key distribution protocol
is outside the scope of this work.
2.2. Secure localization
Node positions are derived using a multilateration tech-
nique which determines the position of a node by exploit-
ing a set of landmark nodes, called anchor nodes, whose
absolute positions are known. The position of an unknown
node u is computed using an estimation of the distances
between the anchor nodes and u. Notice that such dis-
tances are computed by measuring the time needed to suc-
cessfully receive a reply from node u to the beacon
messages previously broadcasted by each anchor node.
In case node u behaves maliciously, the only way in
which it may pretend to be in a location different to the ac-
tual one is by delaying the reply to the beacon message.
However, under some conditions, it is possible to detect
such malicious behaviors by using the Veriﬁable Multila-
teration (VM) technique presented in [1], which uses three
or more anchor nodes to detect misbehaving nodes. In the
rest of this section we brieﬂy summarize the VM operating
principles.
Let V1, V2, and V3 be the anchor nodes (i.e., the veriﬁers)
and let be u the node whose position is unknown. More-
over, let us assume that u lies in the triangle formed by
V1; V2; V3. If u tries to pretend to be farther away from
one anchor then it has to pretend to be closer to another
one. In order to achieve this goal, node uwould be required
to know the relative position of every anchor node in the
network. However, since such information is not available
to node u, it is possible to detect malicious nodes. More
speciﬁcally, let be T1, T2 and T3 be the time needed to
get an answer from u to the beacon message sent by V1,
V2, and V3, respectively. Starting from Ti the corresponding
distance is computed, for 1 6 i 6 3. Let xu, yu denote the
coordinates of the estimated position of u, and let ﬁ(xu, yu)
denote the function representing the difference between
the distance bound and the estimated distance of u from Vi.
fiðxu; yuÞ ¼  ¼
X
i
ðdbi 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðxu  xiÞ2 þ ðyu  yiÞ2
q
Þ
2
ð7Þ
Finally, the estimated position of u is computed using
the minimum mean square estimate (MMSE) that is by
minimizing:
Fðxu; yuÞ ¼
X
f ðxi; yiÞ ð8Þ
Once computed, the estimated position of u undergoes
two different tests before being considered as reliable.
The ﬁrst test, known as d-test, aims at verifying whether
the estimated position is compatible with the distance
bounds previously computed, while the second test,known as point-in-the-triangle-test, aims at verifying
whether the estimated position of u lies inside the triangle
formed by the three veriﬁers. More speciﬁcally:
 d-test: Let derr denote the maximum distance measure-
ment error allowable; therefore the position of u, hxu, yui,
is considered correct if fi(xu, yu) < derr, for 1 6 i 6 3. If the
test fails then at least for one Vi the estimated distance
differs from the distance bound by more than allowed
error. In a such a case the estimation is considered to
be affected by malicious tampering and therefore node
u is marked as Malicious.
 Point-in-the-triangle-test: Distance bounds can be used
in the previous test only if u lies inside the triangle
formed by the three veriﬁers, otherwise the position
of u is considered unveriﬁed and therefore node u is
marked as Unknown.
If both tests are passed, the estimated position is con-
sidered as correct and therefore node u is marked as Ro-
bust. The ﬁnal reputation of each node belonging to the
cluster is stored in a table by the own mesh router.3. Network architecture
The network architecture is composed of clusters of
sensor nodes that exploit a wireless multi-hop mesh back-
bone in order to deliver their data to the Sink. Clusters are
composed of a variable number of sensors, one of which
acting as Sensor Head, and one mesh router acting as Cluster
Head, see Fig. 1.
Sensor Heads are responsible for aggregating encrypted
messages originated from the sensor nodes in their cluster,
while Cluster Heads implement the secure aggregation
scheme also of data coming from different clusters. Notice
that multi-hopping can be exploited by sensor nodes in or-
der to establish connectivity with their Sensor Head. Cluster
Head and Sensor Head roles can be implemented by two
different nodes, one equipped with a WSN interface
(e.g.,IEEE802.15.4) and the other equipped with a WMN
interface (e.g., IEEE 802.11). In particular deployment sce-
nario Sensor Head and Cluster Head roles can be collapsed
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router.
In fact the presence or absence of Sensor head allows or
not to perform two different kind of aggregation: In-Cluster
Aggregation and Aggregation. The former requires the pres-
ence of a Sensor Head and aggregates data coming from
sensors belonging to the same cluster. The related message
is named IAMEX (In-cluster Aggregated Message) and it is
generated by Sensor Head. When performing In-cluster
Aggregation, each sensor concatenates the ids of the mes-
sages being relayed creating in fact a new In-Cluster Aggre-
gated Message (IAMEX). It is worth noticing that, if a
locally generated sample is added to the aggregated
ciphertext then also the local sensor’s id will be appended
to the IAMEX message in order to satisfy the equation 3.
While, in case of Aggregation the data, also coming from
sensors belonging to different clusters, are aggregated.
The related message is named AMEX (Aggregated Message)
and it is generated by the Cluster heads.
The communication is based on a polling schema imple-
mented at the Cluster Head. Notice that our design does not
require all sensor nodes to reply, on the contrary nodes can
fail to reply due to several reasons, e.g., a temporary lack of
connectivity, a limited battery, or simply hardware failures
or a malicious removal. On the other hand, the network
Sinkmust know the ids of the non-responding sensor nodes
in order to decode the cleartext message, as we just said in
previous Section. In order to address such a problem the
Aggregated Message (AMEX) contains a list of the non-
responding nodes in a certain cluster. Such a list can be
easily computed by the Cluster head using the message re-
ceived from the sensor nodes and the list of sensor nodes in
its cluster (obtained using an initial raging procedure);
while the IAMEX message contains the list of the respond-
ing nodes.
The Cluster Head’s architecture is depicted in Fig. 2. Con-
tinuous and dashed lines represent communication paths
exploiting, respectively, IAMEX and AMEX messages. No-
tice that, thanks to the homomorphic additively encryption
scheme, messages of the same type can be aggregated in a
end-to-end fashion by simply adding their ciphertexts and
appending the nodes’ ids.
With regard to the trustworthiness of the nodes, each
Cluster Head uses a node reputation table reporting, for
each sensor node, the trustworthiness of its localization
data, information gathered during the localization phase,
according to security model. i.e., Robust, Malicious or Un-
known. Notice that initially, anchor nodes (i.e., veriﬁers)Fig. 2. Architecture of the Cluster head.are considered to be Robust; while the remaining nodes
are classiﬁed as Unknown. If the reputation is Robust, then
the Mesh router is allowed to treat the data as reliable and
aggregate it; if the reputation is Malicious the data is dis-
carded; while if the reputation is Unknown the data may
be processed or discarded depending on the mesh router
default policy. Notice that in case of In-cluster Aggregation
the use of Veriﬁable Multilateration is not implemented.
In fact, in order to implement VM, a Sensor Head would
be required to receive the reputation table from the rele-
vant mesh routers. However, since the aim of this work
is a strict sharing of tasks between sensor nodes and mesh
routers with the purpose of possibly improving the sensor
nodes’ battery lifetime, this use case has not been imple-
mented. In case there is a Sensor Head, such a node is di-
rectly connected to the Cluster Head.
The entire procedure, exploited in order to securely
convey and aggregate the samples collected by the sensor
nodes to the network Sink, can be decomposed into the fol-
lowing steps:
1. The Cluster Head periodically polls all the sensors in its
cluster. Polling packets can be either ﬂooded across the
entire cluster or, if broadcast is not supported, they can
be sent using unicast transmissions.
2. Upon polling, each sensor generates a packet containing
a single encrypted sample that is then forwarded to the
Cluster Head.
3. The Cluster Head receives the packets coming from sen-
sor nodes in its cluster, evaluate the node reputations
according to the node behavior information, stored in
the table and if a sensor node is classiﬁed as Robust
based on VM results, it stores the received packets in
a local queue, otherwise it discards them. When N pack-
ets are received or when a timeout has expired, the
Cluster Head aggregates its encrypted samples and gen-
erates a AMEX packet that is sent to the Sink.
4. The Sink receives all the AMEX packets, deciphers the
ciphertext and computes the relevant statistical infor-
mation (e.g. average and/or variance).
3.1. Message structure
The message structure, used in order to implement the
secure aggregation scheme, is illustrated in Fig. 3. It con-
sists of 6 ﬁelds, plus an optional list of sensor nodes ids ap-
pended at the end of the message and used only in the
AMEX and the IAMEX message types. The ﬁelds in the
header are packed with the most signiﬁcant byte ﬁrstFig. 3. Message format used in our secure aggregation scheme.
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ferent ﬁelds:
 Version (4-bits). The protocol version (set to 0).
 Type (4-bits). The message type:
– IAMEX. Aggregated message emitted by a Sensor
Head. The Sensor/s ﬁeld contains the number of sen-
sors that contributed to this value. The header is fol-
lowed by the ids of the nodes whose samples have
been summed to produce the aggregated value.This
kind of message is generated in case an in-cluster
aggregation is performed.
– AMEX. Aggregated message emitted by a Cluster
head. The Sensor/s ﬁeld contains the number of sen-
sors that failed to produce a sample. The header is
followed by the ids of the non-responding nodes.
– Sink. Sink message emitted by a Sink. This message
contains the aggregated value in cleartext. The Sen-
sor/s ﬁeld contains the number of sensors that con-
tributed to this value.
 Application (8-bits). Used to distinguish among different
set of monitored information (e.g. humidity, pressure,
etc.). It can be used to map up to 256 different WSN
applications over the same mesh-backhaul.
 Sensor/s (16-bits). Different meanings according to the
particular message type, as described above.
 Sum (32-bits). Sum of the readings produced by the sen-
sor node/s.
 Square (32-bits). Sum of the squares of the readings pro-
duced by the sensor node/s.
 ID (i). List of sensor nodes’ ids (16-bit each). Their mean-
ing depends on the particular message type.
Please note that padding is used in order to ensure that
the whole message contains an integral number of 32-bit
words, for supporting, as just explained in details in Sec-
tion 2, the encoding of average and variance of the values
measured by sensors.4. Simulations
In this section we report on the outcome of our simula-
tions tests which aimed at assessing DARE’s performance
with regard to bandwidth efﬁciency, power consumption,
and security. More speciﬁcally, we evaluate: the band-
width efﬁciency by means the evaluation of the packet
number; the power consumption and the related battery
lifetime using the energy consumption models presented
in [12] and, ﬁnally, the level of security that can be ob-
tained by exploiting node information maliciousness dur-
ing the localization phase. The hop-by-hop (HBH)
aggregation scheme discussed in [4] is not considered in
that, albeit characterized by a slightly higher bandwidth
transmission gain, it does not address the end-to-end secu-
rity concerns.
Notice that, the evaluation of the data conﬁdentiality
and integrity features supported by our hybrid architecture
has already been provided by Castelluccia et al. in [4] and is
thus out of scope for this work. Likewise, the reliability of
the veriﬁable multilateration technique is extensively eval-uated in [1] [10] and it is thus also beyond the goals of this
work.
4.1. Simulation environment
The simulations were carried out using the OMNET++
simulator (version 4.1). The INETMANET and the MiXiM
models have been used in order to simulate respectively
the IEEE802.11-based mesh backhaul and the
IEEE802.15.4-based sensor clusters. Each cluster is com-
posed of one mesh router (See Fig. 4) equipped with two
radio interfaces and one or more wireless sensor/s (See
Fig. 4) each of them equipped with a single radio interface.
The primary mesh router interface, derived from the INET-
MANET framework, is an IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) interface oper-
ating in the ISM 2.4 GHz frequency band while the
secondary, derived from MiXiM framework, is an IEEE
802.15.4 interface operating in ISM 868 MHz frequency
band. It is worth stressing that, the mesh router being
equipped with two different interfaces implementing both
Sensor Head and Cluster Head functionalities. Mesh connec-
tivity is implemented by means of the AODV mesh routing
protocol. The sensor nodes are deployed in a star topology
around the mesh router. One mesh router acts as a gate-
way implementing Sink functionalities.
4.2. Simulation scenarios
The following scenarios have been considered:
 No-Agg. In this scenario, when a Cluster Head receives an
encrypted packet from either its sensors cluster or
neighboring cluster head, it immediately forwards it
to the Sink. No aggregation is performed in this scenario
which serves as baseline for the rest of the evaluation.
 Agg N without VM. Every packet received by the Cluster
Head is stored into a FIFO queue. After the Nth arrivals
the queue is emptied and an AMEX packet is generated
and forwarded to the Sink. The values of N considered
for this study have been 4, 8, 12. The Veriﬁable Multila-
teration technique is not used in this scenario.
 In-cluster Agg N without VM. Packets forwarded by sen-
sor nodes within a certain cluster are aggregated at each
hop in a IAMEX message. IAMEX messages received by
Cluster Heads are forwarded to the Sink. The Veriﬁable
Multilateration technique is not used in this scenario.
 Agg N with VM. Every packet received by the Cluster
Head is stored into a FIFO queue. Then, each 10 s the
Cluster Head veriﬁes each node’ reputation: messages
coming from Malicious node are discarded; messages
coming from Unknown nodes are forwarded towards
the Sinkwithout being aggregated; and ﬁnally messages
generated from Robust nodes are aggregated and an
AMEX packet is generated and forwarded to the Sink.
Simulations results refer to a network setup consisting
of 2 sensor clusters each of them containing one mesh rou-
ter and 50 sensors distributed over a 500  500 m square
ﬁeld where mesh routers and sensors nodes are randomly
distributed at initialization time. Both mesh and sensor
nodes are not mobile. The malicious nodes are randomly
Fig. 4. Simulation environment’s setup.
Table 1
R-Model parameters (s = 1000 bytes).
a(s) [lJ/b] b(s) [W] c [W] h(s) [Mb/s] RMSE [W]
fTX(x) 0.0259 3.8206 4.6543 32 0.0019
fRX(x) 0.0155 3.83 4.2318 26 0.0001
Table 2
S-Model parameters (x = 10 Mb/s).
d(x) [lW/b] g(x) [W] (x) [W] q q RMSE [W]
fTX(s) 0.0022 4.066 4.900 384 0.0114
fRX(s) 0.00079 3.9693 4.4751 640 3.9165  104
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different percentage of malicious nodes. Simulation time
was set to 300 s for all scenarios. The results reported in
this work are the average of 10 runs executed with differ-
ent seed values for the random number generator.
4.3. Energy consumption models and related results
The energy consumption models have been derived
using an empirical evaluation of the power consumption
of typical wireless devices using Energino [12], a real-time
energy consumption monitoring toolkit. Energino’s high
performances in term of both sampling frequency and res-
olution allow to precisely isolate the impact of speciﬁc
trafﬁc patterns on the overall energy consumption of wire-
less devices such as Access Points and/or sensor nodes.
For readers’ convenience, the empirical power con-
sumption model presented in [12] are brieﬂy sketched
here. In the following, R(x) and S(s) are the models which
accounts for power consumption at the wireless node as
function of, respectively, trafﬁc rate and datagram size.
Where x is the amount of trafﬁc transmitted or received
by the wireless node (expressed in Mb/s) and s is the dat-
agram size (expressed in bytes). Notice that the notation
 = Tx, Rx refer to the scenario when the wireless node is
acting as transmitter and receiver, respectively. The R(x)
and the S(s) models are:
RðxÞ ¼
aðsÞ  xþ b if 0 6 x 6 hðsÞ Mb=s;
c if x > hðsÞ Mb=s;

ð9Þ
SðsÞ ¼
dðxÞ  sþ ðxÞ if p 6 s 6 q byte;
gðxÞ if s > q byte;

ð10Þ
The parameters have the following physical meaning: a(s) [lJ/b] is the amount or energy spent by the wireless
device in order to transmit or receive 1 bit from the ses-
sion layer with a datagram size of s bytes;
 b [W] is the amount of power consumed by the wireless
node in idle mode;
 c [W] is the maximum amount of power consumed by
the wireless node and represents the saturation power
consumption;
 d(x) [lW/bytes] is the amount of power consumed by
wireless node in order to transmit or receive 1 byte
from the session layer arriving at a rate of x Mb/s;
 (x) [W] is the maximum power consumed by the wire-
less node, transmitting at xMb/s, using extremely small
packets.
 g(x) [W] is the minimum power consumed by the wire-
less node to transmit trafﬁc at a rate of x Mb/s.
Table 1 reports the parameters for R-Model obtained
using a datagram size s = 1000 bytes, while Table 2 reports
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Fig. 6. Histogram of the AMEX messages’ inter-arrival times for different values of the aggregation threshold N.
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3106 S. Sicari et al. / Computer Networks 57 (2013) 3098–3111the parameters for the new logarithmic S-Model obtained
for a transmission rate x = 10 Mb/s.
4.4. Simulation results
In this section we discuss the simulations results ob-
tained for our 4 reference scenarios, namely: No-Agg, Agg
N without VM, In-cluster Agg N without VM, and Agg N with
VM.
Fig. 5 reports the number of packets delivered to the
Sink over the WiFi interface during the entire simulation
time for increasing values of the aggregation threshold N
without using the VM techniques. As expected, increasing
the value of N results in a signiﬁcant reduction in the num-
ber of packets delivered to the Sink, and thus forwarded
across the network which in time results in a lower chan-
nel utilization and energy consumption. The inter-arrivals
times of aggregated packets are reported in Fig. 5. Notice
that, the initial transition time is strictly related with theFig. 7. Number of message aggregated, forwarded and
Fig. 8. Average power consumption at the wireless sensor node as a funCluster Head’s polling period, which for this simulations
was set to 2 s.
Fig. 6 reports the histogram of the AMEX messages’ in-
ter-arrival times for different values of the aggregation
threshold. As it can be noticed, the inter-arrival time in-
creases with the value of N, in particular for N = 12, inter-
vals as long as 10 s can be observed.
The trustworthiness of the localization data can be en-
hanced using the VM technique described in Section 2.2.
Fig. 7 reports the number of message aggregated, for-
warded and discarded versus a decreasing number of ver-
iﬁes (70, 50, 30, 10). Results show that, thanks to DARE,
data integrity is preserved, in fact, data sent from node
with a bad reputation, i.e. Malicious node, is discarded;
data sent from node uncertain reputation, i.e. Unknown
node, is forwarded to the Sink without aggregation and
evaluated according to the application domain and ad
hoc policies. Only messages coming from node with a good
and veriﬁed reputation, i.e. Robust node, are aggregated.discarded versus a decreasing number of veriﬁes.
ction of the bitrate for a constant datagram length of 1280 bytes.
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between the number of veriﬁers and the number of mes-
sages that can be aggregated. More speciﬁcally, an increase
of the veriﬁers number is strictly related to an increase of
the number of messages that are suitable for aggregation.
On the other hand, lowering the number of veriﬁers causes
more nodes to be marked as Unknown leading to an in-
crease in the number of messages forwarded without being
aggregated.
Finally, it is alsoworthnoticing that, using ahighnumber
of veriﬁers does not guarantee better performance in terms
of number of aggregatedmessages. For example, from Fig. 7
it can be seen that the conﬁguration exploiting 10 veriﬁers
performs better than the conﬁguration exploiting 30 veriﬁ-
ers, since the roleperformedby theveriﬁers strictlydepends
on their position in the network. As a result a small number
ofwell-positioned veriﬁers canperformbetter than anhigh-
er number of veriﬁers deployed randomly.
Figs. 8 and 9 show the power consumption and battery
lifetime respectively, using, as just we said, the model
Energino.
The energy model is also used to study the power con-
sumption and battery lifetime in the case of an In-Cluster
Agg N without VM scenario It is important to notice that
in this scenario the empirical power consumption model
has been applied to the cluster of sensor nodes. Results, re-
ported in Fig. 10, refer to a single wireless sensor node. As
it can be seen, the proposed aggregation scheme leads to a
signiﬁcant power consumption saving and resulting in
extension of a sensor battery lifetime in comparison with
a No-Agg scenario.5. Prototype
A prototype has also been implemented and tested in or-
der to demonstrate the practical viability of our approach inFig. 9. Average power consumption at the wireless sensor node as a functionrealistic settings. This study has been conducted exploiting
4 mesh routers organized in a linear topology (see Fig. 11)
and implementing both Cluster Head and Sensor Head func-
tionalities. A Dell D630 laptop, connected through an Ether-
net cable to the fourth Cluster Head, has been exploited as
network Sink. Sensor nodes have been emulated by means
of a software process runningwithin eachmesh router. This
process emulates a ﬂat WSN computing both the average
and the variance of the physical phenomena monitored
by the WSN (e.g., the temperature). Each sensors cluster
is composed of 60 nodes. The mesh backhaul has been
implemented using theWING toolkit, an experimental IEEE
802.11 wireless mesh network [14]. No veriﬁable multila-
teration technique was used in this scenario.
In the envisioned application, the WSN is required to
monitor the temperature of a certain area, and as a result,
each sensor periodically generates a random temperature
sample uniformly distributed in the range [28,32]. Period
is set to 5 s.
Tables 3 and 4 respectively report the number of pack-
ets and bytes sent at each hop of the network. As in [4], we
consider three scenarios: (i) all sensor nodes reply; (ii) 90%
of the nodes replies; and (iii) only 70% of the sensor nodes
replies. Cluster heads (i.e. mesh routers) do not generates
any sample, moreover, we assume that the distribution of
non-responding nodes is uniform across all the clusters.
As it can be seen, in the No-Agg scenario, nodes that are
closer to the Sink transmit an amount of data that is signif-
icantly higher (see Hop 4 in the tables) than the data trans-
mitted by the previous Cluster Heads. On the other hand, in
the Agg scheme, the number of transmissions is constant
while the amount of bytes exchanged at each hops in-
creases. Such a behavior is due to the ids of the non-
responding nodes that need to be appended to the aggre-
gated samples being transmitted. Such a list becomes lar-
ger and larger as the sample get closer to the Sink.of the datagram size for a constant trafﬁc generation rate of 10 Mb/s.
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Fig. 10. Power consumption and battery lifetime for a sensor node in a cluster.
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State-of-the-art solutions for secure data aggregation
can be classiﬁed as hop-by-hop data aggregation and
end-to-end data aggregation. In the former approach, data
is encrypted by the sensing nodes and decrypted at each
hop before being delivered to the Sink. In the latter ap-
proach, data is decrypted only by the Sink.
Different hop-by-hop solutions [2,15,16,3] assumes that
data security is guaranteed by means of some key distribu-
tion schema. For example SEDAN [3] proposes a secure
hop-by-hop data aggregation protocol, in which each nodecan verify the integrity of its two hops neighbors’ data. SE-
DAN [3] provides a totally distributed scheme to guarantee
data integrity. The SEDAN performance, evaluated by
means of ad hoc simulation, shows a better behavior than
other solutions, i.e., SAWAN [2], in terms of overhead and
mean time to detection. Nevertheless, all hop-by-hop se-
cure data aggregation solutions are vulnerable to attacks
at the intermediate nodes, that can be tampered, leaving
the attackers with complete access to the sensor readings.
In [15] the authors tackle the problem of enabling se-
cure data aggregation and veriﬁcation in sensor networks.
The authors divide the network in clusters and assume that
Fig. 11. The linear network topology exploited during our study.
Table 3
Number of packets relayed at each hop.
Hops No-Agg Agg Agg (90%) Agg (70%)
1 10,860 180 180 180
2 21,660 180 187 193
3 32,520 180 188 193
4 43,380 181 188 193
Table 4
Number of bytes relayed at each hop.
Hops No-Agg Agg Agg (90%) Agg (70%)
1 434,400 7200 8552 10,628
2 866,400 7200 10,784 16,036
3 1,300,800 7200 12,532 20,096
4 1,735,200 7240 14,086 24,084
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mised. The proposed solution consists of two parts: a key
establishment protocol that generates a different key for
each cluster where each node knows only a share of the
cluster key; and a secure data aggregation protocol that
ensures that the Sink does not accept faulty readings. A
protocol for the efﬁcient computation of statistical values
such as the median and the average of the measurements
performed by a WSN is presented in [16]. The protocol
can also estimate the network size and ﬁnd the minimum
and maximum sensor reading. In their work the authors
propose the aggregate-commit-prove framework where
aggregators not only perform the aggregation tasks, but
must also prove that they perform these tasks correctly en-
abling the user to verify that answer given by the aggrega-
tors is a good approximation of the true value even when
the aggregators and/or a fraction of the sensor nodes may
be corrupted.
End-to-end techniques, such as [4,17–20,6], overcome
this limitation by requiring all the nodes to share an
encryption key only with the Sink possibly using novel dis-
tribution schemes [21–23].
Particularly, SeDap [20], one of our previous works, ad-
dresses the privacy as well as security aggregation issues
adopting an end-to-end additively homomorphic encryp-
tion. But this work does not adopt a hybrid architecture
and the evaluation of node reputation is not performed.
An alternative approach is represented by the use of pub-lic-key encryption scheme, such as the one presented in
[18]. The drawback of this solution is represented by the
high computational requirements imposed by public-key
schemes. DyDAP [6] is another our previous work that
combines privacy management with an original end-to-
end aggregation algorithm. By using simulation tools, we
demonstrate that DyDAP can effectively reduce the load
in congested WSN while at the same time guaranteeing
anonymity and data integrity. In [17,19] the authors pres-
ent an end-to-end encryption scheme for reverse multicast
trafﬁc, i.e. trafﬁc between sensor nodes and the Sink. The
proposed approach allows nodes to perform data aggrega-
tion operations by operating only on the ciphertext, which
in time provides the advantage that intermediate aggrega-
tors do not have to carry out costly decryption and encryp-
tion operations, and thus, do not require to store sensitive
cryptographic keys.
In [21] the authors tackle the problem of designing a
clustered sensor networks able to isolate the effects of
malicious nodes, i.e. captured nodes, to speciﬁc clusters
or subgroups. The proposed scheme can maintain ﬂexibil-
ity in providing different security concerns for different
sensor subgroups. Similar objectives are pursued by the
authors of [22] that aim at providing any pair of nodes in
a sensor network with the possibility to establish a conﬁ-
dential and secure communication channel while loading
each sensor with a small set of keys. The solution is based
on two protocols. The former is secure with a ﬁxed proba-
bility and that is used for the initial handshaking proce-
dures. The latter protocol instead has a level of security
that can be traded off with the overall communication
overhead.
Two cooperative protocols (CoMAC and ExCo) are pre-
sented in [23]. The two schemes use standard (and inex-
pensive) symmetric cryptographic primitives coupled
with key evolution and few messages exchange. The
authors evaluate the two solutions using simulations and
show that network designers can carefully select the right
scheme and tune appropriate system parameters in order
to achieve the desired level of robustness and overhead.
As opposed to the aforementioned solutions, our work
exploits an hybrid sensor/mesh network architecture
where an homomorphic encryption scheme is imple-
mented by the sensor nodes, while data aggregation oper-
ations are performed by mesh routers that are not required
to know the actual content of the message being processed.
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ity and integrity while, at the same time, reducing the
amount of trafﬁc exchanged over the network and thus
the overall power consumption.
In [24] a trade-off between data protection and feasibil-
ity/complexity is presented. In particular, the authors ex-
ploit data aggregation and secure localization in order to
centrally (i.e., at the Sink) compute an overall assessment
of the data quality. Similarly, in [10,9] the authors exploit
a technique known as Veriﬁable Multilateration in order to
improved the trustworthiness of sensor nodes’ localization
information. The authors show that when the veriﬁers play
a mixed strategy, the malicious node can masquerade as
non-malicious with very low probability. In this work we
combined the aforementioned secure localization mecha-
nism with an hybrid data aggregation scheme for wireless
sensor/mesh networks. The hybrid nature of our architec-
ture allows sensor nodes to use their resources, i.e. their
battery, only to implement sensing and data forwarding
functionalities, leaving mesh routers in charge for secure
data aggregation and secure node localization. Localization
information are exploited for evaluating node reputation.
The problem of collaborative data aggregation and data
privacy is jointly addressed by the authors of [25]. Two
algorithms are proposed: CPDA and SMART. The former ex-
ploits a clustering protocol in order to reduce the commu-
nication overhead. The latter employs data slicing
techniques in order to securely distribute the data to be
aggregated to the nearest sensor nodes for aggregation.
Our architecture introduces on the one hand a sharing of
tasks between sensor nodes and mesh routers for what
concern data aggregation and security, and on the other
hand exploits the concept of reputation for improving data
quality.
In [26] the authors propose a set of secret perturbation
schemes that can effectively address sensor data conﬁden-
tiality issues without losing the bandwidth efﬁciency gains
delivered by the concept of additive data aggregation. The
proposed approach requires the Sink to share a secret with
each sensor node. A sensor node that wants to report some
sensory data to its Sink, ﬁrst sums the original data with
the secret and then transmit the result of the operation
to the Sink. As opposed to our solution, this work addresses
only data conﬁdentiality without tacking the challenge of
node reputation that improves the security level of the
whole network.7. Conclusion
In this paper we presented DARE an architecture
addressing both node reputation and run-time data trust-
worthiness. DARE is based on an hybrid wireless sensor/
mesh networks architecture which allows to allocate com-
putationally intensive tasks such as the secure localization
technique based on veriﬁable multilateration and data
aggregation to the mesh routers, leaving sensor nodes in
charge of the mere data gathering functionalities.
Simulations results show a signiﬁcant improvement in
terms of both amount of data exchanged over the wireless
medium and power consumption at the wireless sensornodes. Moreover, we found a clear correlation between
the number of veriﬁers deployed in the network and the
number of messages that can be aggregated. Finally, a
real-world prototype has been implemented and tested
in order to verify the suitability of our architecture to a real
use case, collecting and processing the mean and the aver-
age value of the temperature measured by a WSN.
As a future work we plan to further investigate the
trade-offs between number of veriﬁers and the perfor-
mance of the network in terms of aggregated message
and thus energy consumption. The investigation of smart
techniques for deploying veriﬁers across the network is
also considered and research direction worth pursuing.
Furthermore, the application of multimedia data secure
aggregation techniques to our architecture is under study.
Finally, in order to better characterize the security proﬁle
of the sensor nodes and the related sensing data trustwor-
thiness additional metrics are under investigation.References
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